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Introduction
Hacking Team Story
Began as a security services provider in 2003
Founders had previous experience with spyware development
Recently develops tools for “offensive security”
Remote Control System Galileo (RCS)
System for targeted surveillance of individuals
Available exclusively to the governmental agencies
System details were not released to the public
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The Hacking Team Data Leak
Data Leak
Carried out by an unknown hacker in July 2015
RCS and full documentation was made public
Research Objectives
Analyze RCS functions and processes
Run the system in KYPO cyber range
Evaluate short and long term impact of the data leak
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Remote Control System Galileo
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Architecture
Shards
Anonymizer Chain 1
Anonymizer Chain 2
Target Device 1
Target Device 2
Master Node
Console Operator Network External Network
Collector 1
Collector 2Internal Firewall
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APT x RCS Surveillance Operation Lifecycle
Mandiant, APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units
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Surveillance Operation
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Phase 1 – Compilation
Anonymizer ChainConsole Collector Target Device
Master Node
Agent 001
Operator Create agent Target
Requires target device speciﬁcation (type, OS)
Agent— spyware tailored for a speciﬁc target device
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Phase 2 – Inﬁltration
Anonymizer ChainConsole Collector Target Device
Master Node
Operator TargetInfiltrate device
Depends on chosen infection vector
Usually carried out “outside” the RCS
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Phase 3 – Persistence
Anonymizer ChainConsole Collector Target Device
Master Node
Operator TargetData extraction & agent update
The agent synchronizes at set intervals
Extracted data is stored at the RCS database
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Phase 4 – Exﬁltration
Anonymizer ChainConsole Collector Target Device
Master Node
Operator TargetEnd operation Dispose of agent
The operation is terminated
All agents are ordered to uninstall during next synchronization
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Novel Approaches in RCS
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Frontend
Agent
Properties adopted from known malware
Infection vectors – targeted malwareSurveillance functions – spywareC&C communication –multilayered botnet
Lacks deep customization options of APT malware
Focused on stealth at the expense of function
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Backend
Administrative Interface
Every action available through point & click
Exhaustive user documentation and system wizards
Consumer Support
Updates to infection vectors, functions etc.
Access to 0-day exploits
Hacking Team had a kill switch for each sold instance of RCS
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Conclusion
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Conclusion
Short-Term Effect
No large misuse incidents were reported
Contributed to Adobe Flash deprecation
Long-Term Effect
Marginal – RCS adopted processes from existing malware
Administrative interface –might make APT attacks widelyaccessible
Support processes – used in advanced mass spread malwareframeworks
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